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Abstract 
This paper offers a suggested framework for formulating economic policy for the cultural 
and creative industries. It argues that both the cultural and (recently-defined) creative 
industries are not a recent phenomenon but historically central to the development of the 
modern industrial economy. 
 
It shows that, in terms of conventional economic theory, these industries are a 'proper 
economic sector': they have a distinctive resource, production process, and output. There 
are therefore sound theoretical reasons to explain their present dynamism, notably the 
productivity revolution brought about by remote and multiple service delivery (internet, 
telecomms, broadcast etc) 
 
It defines this distinctive resource, process and output. The 'product' is culturally 
differentiated goods and services. They are therefore central to the reproduction of 
culture and hence have to be the object of policy whether or not there is market failure, 
because culture is a legitimate area of social and political concern.  
 
The production process is 'flexible production of short life cycle goods to an abstract or 
imperfect specification' which reverses the paradigm of Fordism. Cities, particularly 
global cities, have become the decisive location for this new form of industrial 
organization and special attention has to be given to the the city’s cultural and creative 
infrastructure.  
 
The primary resource is creative human labour. This is a necessary resource and special 
attention has to be paid (in policy) to catering for it and creating the infrastructure it 
needs to function. 
 
This paper was originally prepared in October 2007 at the request of the Creative 
Industries Journal but was not submitted. 
 
Keywords: Creative Industries; Cultural Economics; Industrial Classification; Innovation; 
Design 
 
JEL codes: Z10, Z11, L8 
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PART 1: METHOD 
“You are a clever, generous man, Dymov,” she would say, “but you have one very 
serious defect. You take absolutely no interest in art. You don't believe in music or 
painting.” “I don't understand them,” he would say mildly. “I have spent all my life in 
science and medicine, and I never had time to take an interest in the arts.”  
“But that's awful, Dymov!” “Why? Your friends don’t know anything about science or 
medicine, but you don't hold it against them. Everyone does his thing. I don't understand 
landscapes and operas, but the way I look at it is that if one lot of sensible people devote 
their lives to them, and another lot of sensible people pay immense sums for them, they 
must have a use. I don't understand them, but that’s no reason to disbelieve them.”  
Anton Chekhov, The Grasshopper 
Introduction 
This article asks whether there are economic grounds to treat the Cultural and Creative 
Industries as an economic sector or, more precisely, an industry. 
I conclude that there are such grounds. The cultural and creative industries use a common 
resource, organized in a distinct process to produce a distinctive product. The common 
resource is creative labour, an innately human activity specific to the formation and 
transformation of culture. The cultural and creative industries mobilise this to produce a 
specific type of product or use-value, culturally-differentiated goods and services. In 
consuming culturally-differentiated artefacts, such as fashion, film, performances, 
buildings, art, and so on, people fulfil two interlinked purposes: they enjoy themselves, 
and they establish a community of taste with those who enjoy themselves similarly, 
differentiating themselves from those who enjoy themselves otherwise. 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has transformed the scale of these 
activities by revolutionising the service relationship, which previously required humans 
to be close or in contact, and can now be delivered over distances to indefinitely large 
numbers of people. These changes have removed material limits to the productivity of 
services. 
This has generated a new technological paradigm, spanning a variety of previously 
distinct activities, to create a homogenous whole with a new structure of industrial 
organisation. This structure delivers to an abstract and imprecise specification, 
epitomized in fashion, in contrast to the concrete and precise specification epitomized in 
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Henry Ford’s ‘any colour you want, as long as it’s black’. 
Based on these twin ideas of culturally differentiated product and imprecise specification, 
I define more precisely what creative activity consists of. I conclude it is a specific type 
of human activity that enters (like ‘mental’ labour, of which it is a form) to a greater or 
lesser degree into the production of all goods. It is the primary requirement for producing 
to abstract and imprecise specifications, where the task in hand is inherently non-
automatic, and cannot be accomplished by a machine or by mechanising – assembly-line 
style – the performance of labour. 
To summarise so far, the cultural and creative industries produce culturally-differentiated 
products to abstract and imprecise specifications, employing predominantly creative 
labour to do so. This has become a rapidly growing branch of the division of labour – an 
industry – as a result of the remote and multiple delivery of services. 
This leads to changes in which types of enterprise or activity should be considered 
‘creative’ from an economic point of view. I conclude that the ‘cultural industries’ and 
‘creative industries’ are parts of a single whole. I conclude that ‘popular’ creative and 
cultural activities, notably sport, should be included once it is recognised that the defining 
attribute of the cultural and creative industries is the production of differentiation. I 
conclude that an integral and paradigmatic element of these industries has been omitted, 
namely computer software. This omission is wrong for two reasons: software writing is 
creative, as defined above, and is integral to the technological changes that have brought 
about the recent rapid growth of this industry. 
I finally argue that the concept of a cultural and creative industry, thus defined, better 
captures the emerging economic reality that we have inherited from the last century than 
the contradictory and inadequate categories of the ‘knowledge economy’ and the 
‘information economy’ that have dominated late 20th Century discourse on the shape of 
the modern economy. These are based on the erroneous idea of amalgamating two 
superficially similar but essentially opposed activities: the mechanical transmission or 
automatic processing of electronic data by inanimate devices, and the creative 
organisation of social relations by human agency. 
What is an industrial sector? 
I base my argument on the conventional meaning of the words ‘industry’ or ‘sector’, 
which are economically well-defined. I will show that the cultural and creative industries 
conform to this definition – that they pass a test of ‘industry-hood’ implicit in the way 
economists commonly speak of industries or sectors. However, a study of this common 
usage shows that these words are significantly more problematic than usually recognised. 
Economists and non-economists alike are far too ready to assume that the idea of an 
‘industry’ is so well-defined and established that existing industries, such as agriculture, 
manufacturing or financial services, offer some kind of pre-existing benchmark of good 
practice, against which upstart new candidates can be judged and found wanting. The 
idea that existing industries are defined in an economically coherent manner in fact falls 
well short of the mark, once we study how this definition is done.  
Actually, the economy is in a state of constant evolution, changing the economic 
landscape in ways that the existing, set classifications do not always capture. As a result, 
attempts are constantly being made to define allegedly new economic branches in an 
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effort to capture new structures in formation. An example already given is the so-called 
‘knowledge economy’. Others abound: recent attempts include a putative innovation 
sector, the life sciences, and the environmental sector. 1 On this, the US Bureau of the 
Census (1993:§5.3) notes: 
Changes in industrial classifications interrupt the continuity of associated time series. But economic 
classification systems cannot remain unchanged indefinitely if they are to capture the full scope of 
constantly evolving industrial and business activities in our economy. As Peter Struijs (Williamsburg 
Conference [10], p. 14) stated, “...changes cannot be measured appropriately when the measuring 
instrument is changing constantly, but not changing it reduces the significance of information on the 
industrial structure. 
Reactions thus come from two quarters I will call fools and angels. 
For the fools, rushing is everything. Dynamic thrusting markets throw up exciting new 
trends in communication, industrial organisation, social structures and not least, profit 
opportunities, faster than the statistical eye can follow. We must classify, measure and 
monitor these new developments (and, ideally, make them the subject of public policy) 
before they melt into air under the relentless glare of modernity. 
The angels’ watchword is ‘tread carefully’. The present statistical order is tried and 
tested. It was good enough for our ancestors, and it is good enough for us. New-fangled 
industries, with rafts of performance indicators and global comparators, have no 
economic justification, lead to more confusion than insight, and serve no purpose beyond 
transferring hard-earned taxpayers’ money from gullible public servants to the pockets of 
unscrupulous consultants. 
Both views have their merits, suggesting an orderly debate is needed, which  calls for 
some rules. I suggest three principles: testable grounds, the level playing field and the 
barndoor principle.  
Testable grounds says that there has to be evidence that a sector exists. It is a bad idea to 
invent an industry just because it has become fashionable or developed a convincing 
argument for public support. The level playing field principle says new candidates should 
be judged on the same basis as existing ones: we cannot exclude the creative sector on 
grounds that would rule out the service sector, though nor can we include it on grounds 
that do not apply to at least one existing sector. Finally, the barndoor principle says a big 
enough target will show up in any classification which captures at least one empirical 
characteristic. We do not need to be too concerned, therefore, that the candidate industry 
is perfectly measured. If there really is an industry in the making, we do not need a 100% 
perfect statistical system to find it, because a genuinely new industry spreads its presence 
so wide that it is impossible to miss. And studying the grounds for its inclusion is 
probably the best way to define it more accurately. 
The method of this article 
These three principles determine my method. I propose to examine the grounds for 
treating other groupings of enterprises as industries, and ask if they apply to the creative 
and cultural industries.  
To clarify, I consider two possible objections. The first, from the camp of the fools, is the 
                                                 
1 More cautious are crosscutting taxonomies such as Pavitt’s classification of ‘innovating firms’ (see for example Archibugi 2002) 
without proposing these should be defined as a specific sector. 
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sui generis argument: the creative industries are new and excitingly different. This is self-
defeating: the cultural and creative sector qualifies for ‘industry-hood’ on existing 
grounds. They are an industry because they are like any other industries. Otherwise, why 
treat them as an industry at all? A platypus is classified as a mammal not because it lays 
eggs unlike all other mammals, but because like all other mammals it is warm-blooded 
and suckles its young even though it lays eggs.  
The second objection, from the camp of the angels, is the statistical heritage argument. 
The existing definitions may be suspect, but they provide an invaluable resource for 
economists because the data goes back much farther in time than for new industries. This 
is unsurprising, since not being old is the most easily provable consequence of being new. 
The answer to the second objection is surprisingly straightforward: neither the cultural 
nor the creative industries are new. Actually, they predate manufacture, agriculture and 
‘services’, to which the statisticians usually confine themselves. People have being 
paying money for culture since antiquity. Creation is as old as, well, creation. Culture and 
creation should be recognised as an industry not because they have just arrived, but 
because they have always been there. The problem is only that we have not noticed them. 
Culture and creation in the history of the modern economy 
Why haven’t we noticed them? Discussion on the meaning and role of culture, creativity 
and civilization has preoccupied social sciences for centuries, but have only recently 
captured the attention of economists. The term ‘cultural industry’ dates back to Adorno’s 
and Horkheimer’s (1947) classic work, when national accounts were in their infancy, the 
US classification system was 11 years old and the UK system had not yet been invented. 
Their ideas in turn arise from a distinction of the German Enlightenment, on which Elias 
(1997) has written extensively, between ‘civilisation’ and ‘culture’, which gave rise to the 
idea that culture is a productive activity. 
The real issue is not that an industry has sprung into existence, but that modern history 
has brought an old one to our attention: it has brought to light the mildly distasteful fact 
that cultural products are economically valued. They are not only a product of labour, 
usually hard manual labour, but one that consumers pay sometimes sensational amounts 
of money to obtain. 
Cultural artefacts are the primeval form of wealth in its most fabulous form – treasure. As 
Tolkien’s Gollum attests, treasure is ‘precious’. But what bestows the quality of 
preciousness? Not metal and stone, but the unique and delightful forms into which they 
are wrought by intelligence, taste, and labour. Even coins and notes carry ritual symbols 
of reputation.2 Wealth, arguably the most basic category of economics, in its most 
primitive form exists as a mass not just of materials, nor even just labour, but creative 
labour. 
Moreover cultural artefacts have driven the development of productive forces from 
antiquity to modernity. Weber’s idea that abstinence is the foundation of the capitalist 
system, living on in the prejudice that only homogenous material necessities are ‘true’ 
economic goods, have obscured the critical role of cultural products played in its origins.  
                                                 
2 In the monetary reform carried out in the kingdom of Castile between 1680 and 1686, new currency was issued including a 
monogram of Mary on the back with the words ‘Protectione Virtut’. Among the grounds were that debasement-weary Castilians were 
more likely to trust the Virgin than King Philip. See Jefferies (2008). 
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Theatre was, essentially, the world’s first Just-In-Time production process. The book, and 
print, is the industrial product to which many attribute the origins of modernity. The 
modern world trading system which fuelled the early city-states of Venice and Genoa, 
and the subsequent emergence of Flanders and the Netherlands as the epicentre of early 
capitalism was set in place by rise of luxury and artistic consumption among the new 
merchant, industrial and yeoman classes who saw, in the purchase and flaunting of fine 
things, a way to ‘prove’ their social status by means of products in the face of a dominant 
social class which defined itself by birth. Kippen (2004) records that “Merchants who 
were princes in wealth, rather than by birth, were able to outstrip true nobility. 
Extravagance became so universal that the church and crown thought it necessary to put a 
check on the ostentatious display of the newly rich.” As Braudel (1979:351) notes: 
The history of dress … poses all problems, those of primary materials, of processes of manufacture, of 
cost price, of cultural fixities, of fashion, and of social hierarchies… nothing could prevail against the 
parvenu passion for wearing clothes which, in the west, were the first sign of the slightest social 
promotion… It was the same in the most mediocre quarters. At Rumegies in Flanders, near 
Valenciennes, according to the curate’s diary, rich peasants sacrificed all luxuries for dress. “young men 
with hats encrusted with gold and silver, and then the rest: girls with foot-high coiffures and other habits 
in proportion.” 
Clothing was the heart and soul of the industrial revolution. The huge majority of 
mechanical inventions were constructed to make it and the very first ‘manufactury’, 
established in 1772 in the Pennines, was Arkwright’s Water Frame. 
The history of the industrial capitalism is almost a history of textiles. In 1733 John Kay 
invented the flying shuttle, followed in 1760 by Higham and Hargreaves’ Spinning 
Jenny. Arkwright’s water frame was followed in 1783 by Cartwright’s power loom. 
Boulton and Watt’s steam engines were first deployed massively neither in mines nor in 
trains but powering this same device. By 1802, 4 -5 per cent of the national income of 
Britain came from textile manufacture. In 1812 the UK workforce contained 100,000 
spinners and 250,000 weavers and cotton accounted for 8 per cent of GDP. By 1830, 48% 
of UK exports were cotton textiles. Manchester by 1860 had acquired the name 
‘cottonopolis’. Cotton was undisputedly the single product at the centre of the American 
Civil war. 
The automation of pattern-making lies at the origins of computing in the creatively 
automated patterns of the Jacquard Loom, which inspired Ada Lovelace to devise the 
world’s first punched card computing system. The drive for industrially reproducible 
colour gave birth to the modern chemical industry. The movies and the gramophone 
record rival the car for the post of status iconic industry of the twentieth century.  
Cultural and creative activity constitute, in short, an economic factor. 
The communications revolution and the new technological paradigm 
We have now started to notice the role of culture in industry because recent technological 
changes have forced us to deal with our previous error. As I will show, the cultural and 
creative industries have become a centre of radical growth. I argue that this new 
phenomenon instantiates what Perez (2003) terms a socio-economic paradigm – a 
combined a technological and social transformation arising from the rapid growth of a 
significant new technology. Previous examples are the effects of steam machinery from 
1830, electrical machinery and products from 1890, or the changes wrought by oil-fired 
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devices that became known as Fordism.  
It should be evident that the scale of cultural production has undergone a radical change 
and it is important to understand why. It is, I think, wrong to see the cause as a purely 
physical increase in communication or automatic processing, which is why I think the 
ideas of the ‘information revolution’ and ‘knowledge industry’ are misleading. 
Economically speaking, the decisive change is in the productivity of services arising from 
their remote and multiple delivery. Until the telephone, services – interactions between 
humans – were a subordinate part of the economy because proximity was required to 
deliver them. Either producer and consumer needed to be physically next to each other 
leading to the paradigm of performance (musical performance, theatrical performance, 
teaching, games or, to take an example outside the creative matrix, meetings), or several 
consumers needed to be physically next to the same product, leading to the paradigm of 
display or exhibition (for example art works, buildings, jewellery and fashion). The 
advent of electronic communication, spanning a wider and wider range of human senses, 
has transformed both performance and display by removing limitations of both distance 
and quantity. A performance or a display can be viewed by an arbitrary number of people 
in an arbitrary number of places. 
The effect has been over- and mis-stated in the idea that ‘time-space compression’ is 
rendering distance and boundaries irrelevant. This takes quasi-Messianic forms in 
Marshall McLuhan’s (1966) early vision:  
After three thousand years of explosion, by means of fragmentary and mechanical technologies, the 
Western World is imploding. During the mechanical ages we had extended our bodies in space. Today, 
after more than a century of electronic technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself 
in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned. (cited by David 
Harvey in Held and McGrew 2000:84).  
As Harvey (2000:86) perceptively counters ‘[T]he central paradox [is that] the less 
important the spatial barriers, the greater the sensitivity of capital to the variations of 
place within space, and the greater the incentive for places to be differentiated in ways 
attractive to capital.’ Actually, the thirst for physical proximity has risen with the new 
technology. The city has been re-invented, the hollowed-out inner-city centres of the 50s 
becoming the most sought-after and desirable locations for living and working alike. 
Remote delivery has created a hierarchy of service quality. Face-to-face meeting and live 
performance are the greatest premium whilst mere broadcast is the lowest. The 
exponential rise in quantity of direct human interactions has raised, not lowered, the 
demand for the most immediate and high quality interaction: inhabiting the same space. 
Cultural production is overwhelmingly urban. Producers have developed a new mode of 
industrial organisation in which the flexibility needed to deliver ever greater varieties of 
experience for consumers is achieved by ever greater variety of interaction between them, 
concentrating them in a close physical space – the modern city – which also becomes the 
venue for the most sought-after experiences of display and performance. 
This has brought to our attention a fact that was always present, but which until now has 
been accorded a secondary or non-existent status: namely, creative activity is actually a 
distinguishing feature of human existence. We are human because our nature can neither 
to our purely animal past, nor to the mechanical artefacts we have recently created. 
Creation is a defining feature of human existence, and economists ignore it at their peril. 
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There is therefore no sound ground to exclude either culture or creativity from economic 
calculations, any more than digging into the ground, working a machine, or sitting in an 
office. There is to the contrary a case for treating culture as the quintessential outcome, 
and creativity as the quintessential activity, of what makes production and consumption 
distinctively human social, political and economic activity.  
PART 2: EVIDENCE 
Not by bread alone: mass cultural commodity production 
Chart 1 demand for creative and food products in the UK 1992-2004 
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
£b
n 
at
 c
ur
re
nt
 p
ric
es
Creative products
Food products 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics I-O tables 2004 
In 2000 British households, for the first time, spent on average more money on leisure 
than on food, the share of leisure products having risen from 11.2 per cent of household 
income in 1980 to 17 per cent in 2000. According to the measure of creative industry 
output published by the Office for National Statistics,3 the average annual growth rate of 
GVA at current basic prices for the creative industries, between 1992 and 2004, was 6.7 
per cent compared with 5.5 per cent in the economy. This growth is understated by the 
low growth of the manufacturing component of this output which grew at 1.3 per cent, 
while the services component grew at 8.0 per cent. 
In comparison, the output of the food sector as defined by the ONS grew, between 1995 
and 2004, at an annual average rate of 3.8 per cent. In 1996, the demand for creative 
products at £147bn for the first time exceeded that on food at £140bn. By 2004, the 
figures were £247bn and £163bn respectively. The creative industries contribution to 
GVA at £92.0bn reached 8.8 per cent of the total compared with food at £80.3bn, 7.7 per 
                                                 
3 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_economy/Input_Output_Analyses_2006_edition.pdf . All GVA figures in current 
pounds unless otherwise stated. ONS estimates of output differ from DCMS estimates. They are consistent with other industrial 
sectors and the national accounting framework of the UK, so when the purpose is to make comparisons, they are more robust. 
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cent of production. 
Chart 2 demand for ‘business-led’ creative products 
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Source: Office for National Statistics I-O tables 2004 
In a parallel development, intermediate business spending on creative products 
(architectural services, software and advertising) rose from £33bn to £81bn and 
investment in these products from £6.8bn to £16bn. The British public, according to 
UNESCO, in 2004 attained the unexpected status of the world’s most cultured consumers  
The growth also has employment consequences. According to DCMS estimates, UK 
creative employment reached 2.1mn by 2000. In London, by 2001 there were 394,300 
people working directly in creative industries and a further 131,100 working creatively 
outside these industries. 
Britain’s particular success notwithstanding, the phenomenon is a worldwide one.4 
UNESCO records that between 1980 and 1998, imports of cultural goods as a proportion 
of all trade rose from 2.5 per cent to 3.8 per cent when the world total reached $213.7 bn. 
This broke down as follows: 
Table 1: growth in world imports of cultural products 
Product Type Annual average growth 
1980-1998 (per cent) 
Printed matter and literature 7.1
Music 10.4
Visual Arts 6.3
Cinema and Photography 6.4
Radio and Television 8.4
Games and Sporting Goods 11.3
Total Cultural 8.7
                                                 
4 http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/pdf/cscl/International%20Flows.pdf  
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Total World Imports 6.2
 
A new mass body of monetary demand, catering for tastes previously regarded as elite or 
luxury, has emerged over the last 10-20 years.  
Despite complex differences the creative industries possess a striking number of features 
in common. They are urbanised and centred in the large metropolises. London contains 
32 per cent of all creative employment compared to 15 per cent of total employment. 
Large world cities – New York, Tokyo, Los Angeles, Paris, Berlin, and increasingly 
‘Southern’ cities such as Singapore, Beijing, Shanghai, Moscow and Mumbai have all 
become growth centres. They are characteristically high-value added, with output per 
person substantially above the general average, and a tendency to rise faster. Between 
1995 and 2000, output per employee in the creative industries as a whole rose from 
£27,600 to £34,600 (an annualised rate of 4.6 per cent) compared with £24,100 to 
£25,900 for the UK as a whole over the same period.  
This underlines a fact that several commentators have noted: the creative industries are 
empirically coherent,5 behaving very similarly. With few exceptions, they rise and fall 
together; they are high value-added, involve intellectual property, and use the distributed 
risk-handling contracts described in Richard Caves’ (2000) Creative Industries: contracts 
between Art and Commerce. They locate in the same places, and use a similar and often 
interchangeable workforce. 
This strongly supports the idea that they are the outcome of some common process. The 
barndoor principle is relevant: something so big is going on that it is only possible to miss 
it if we fail to pay attention. 
What makes an industry industrial? the barndoor principle at work 
With the above in mind, the first logical question to ask is: what common economic 
factors might generate the empirical coherence of the new growth industries? The best 
way to unearth these common factors is therefore to ask what qualifies existing sectors as 
‘industries’ and ask if this helps explain the coherence of the new growth areas. 
At first sight, the idea of an industrial sector appears intuitively obvious. This is a 
problem, because it is not in fact obvious. 
Consider three traditional sectors: Agriculture, Manufacturing and Transport. What 
makes each a ‘sector’? The first, uncritical and intuitive answer is that they each produce 
a single type of product. Agriculture produces food, transport produces transport, and 
manufacture produces manufactures. 
But do they? The agricultural sector is not really defined not by what it produces, but 
where its produce comes from. No product characteristic really unites food, cotton and 
wood. The first is eaten, the second is worn and the third is a construction material. Even 
the land itself is hardly an arbiter of agricultural status, or mining and oil extraction 
would count as a peculiar kind of farming. 
What about manufacture, arguably the central category of industrial classification 
                                                 
5 The first to draw attention to this empirical coherence was probably Richard Caves (2000) in a detailed and seminal analysis of the 
industrial and structure of the creative industries and the nature of contracts between creative producers. GLA (2002) noted the 
similarity in patterns of growth across the creative industries, and attention is drawn to it in Hutton et al (2007) 
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systems? You can no more eat what tractors make than plough a field with a toaster. 
Manufacturers do not even use a single, common, resource such as the land. What unites 
them is a process – they set machinery and labourers to work in a single physical 
location. 
Surely, at least transport at least creates a single product? It produces the utility of 
moving things from one place to another. But now there is no common resource, other 
than motive power. Nor is there a common process: transport uses land, sea or air, and 
only by a stretch of the imagination can it be said that flying is a kind of rolling or sailing 
a kind of walking. The only thing that unites transport providers is the utility they offer. 
So what actually makes an industry into an industry? The answer is: because the 
statisticians say so. Their classification system is described in NACE/SIC the manual 
(ONS 2003) as follows: 
The main criteria employed in delineating divisions and groups (the two and three digit categories, 
respectively) of NACE concern the characteristics of the activities of the producing units… An activity 
is said to take place when resources such as equipment, labour, manufacturing techniques, information 
networks or products are combined, leading to the creation of specific goods or services. An activity is 
characterised by an input of products (goods or services), a production process and an output of 
products. 
Thus any one of common inputs, common process, or common products may define an 
industry. And as we have seen, few industries possess all three. 
The reader should thus abandon any hope that there is any pre-existing 100% scientific 
classification system to hand. The system is a compromise. Yet, Johnson might well have 
remarked, the surprising thing is that the system works at all. By and large, industries 
produce what they are supposed to, and products come from where they are expected. For 
102 of 123 products listed in the 2004 I-O tables, more than 80% of that product is 
produced in a single sector. Conversely, for 87 of 123 industrial sectors, a single product 
is more than 80% of the output of that sector, and makes up 57.9% of the output of the 
least specialized sector, organic chemicals.6 
Why should this be? The most plausible explanation is that the classification system 
captures something real about the economy it refers to in spite of itself. There would 
appear to be economic forces tending towards specialization which, by and large, 
outweigh the forces tending towards product diversification. The most likely reason that 
tractor companies do not make shirts, and shirt companies do not make tractors, is that 
economies of scope and scale drives them to confine themselves to what Porter (1998) 
terms a ‘core business’. There is always a parallel tendency to diversification, but at the 
level of the productive unit at least, specialization dominates. 
The question is, then, can we see these same tendencies to specialisation at work in the 
creative industries, and do they exhibit common features in their inputs, processes or 
outputs? In fact, I will show, they manifest all three.  
PART 3: THEORY 
What is a cultural industry? 
Do the cultural and creative industries share a common input, produce a common output, 
                                                 
6 This is treated in more detail in McVittie (2007) and in Bakhshi, McVittie and Simmie (2007) 
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or use a common process? Actually they do all three. The problem is to understand what 
this input, output, and process consist of, since although each has been examined 
separately by economists, they are rarely looked at together. 
The specific use, I argue, is a differentiated7 cultural product. A consumer buys a ticket 
for a film, a game, a play or an exhibition, and wants to see that specific film, team, play, 
or exhibition. Each artwork, each pair of shoes and even each performance or night out, is 
in effect a different product. The consumer of cultural products actively seeks this 
difference.  
In the world of books, music, film, theatre, art, video and, not least, fashion, the 
consumer in choosing a genre, brand or style defines him or herself as part of a 
community of persons that share the same tastes.8 
This is directly obvious with, say, dancing, eating or clubbing, and is visible in visits to 
the opera, the theatre or a meal out, each with its associated codes of dress and style, in 
which the company is always an element – in events such as Opera or the Rocky Horror 
Show, as decisive as the action itself – a vital factor in the continued popularity of live 
performance. Nowhere is it more obvious than in sport, which makes this a prime 
candidate for cultural-creative status. It may be thought that contact with the crowd is the 
defining feature of cultural-creative distinction, but if anything, the capacity to invest 
symbolic meaning is most required of a product when the community cannot be seen, a 
point which preoccupies Benedict Anderson (2007) in his Imagined Communities. In this 
work he asks (but, it has been argued, does not answer) 9 the question: how and why are 
communities of class and nation established, since the people concerned cannot see each 
other? Hesmondhalgh (2007) indeed regards the attachment of symbolic significance as 
the primary function of cultural production. 
As Bertil Ollman points out,10 the role of even such mundane objects as flags play a 
critical role in this respect. Alongside this we find the paraphernalia of symbolic national 
identification: anthems, types of sport, ‘national’ literature, iconic institutions and 
figureheads. Dress goes well beyond fashion in establishing community, and revealing 
one’s face has been turned by the West into a frontline symbol of its values. 
This has a direct parallel in cultural products in the form of loyalty. Where a viewer 
watches a particular television programme or listens to a CD track, she or he consciously 
or unconsciously seeks out the fact that others also will watch that programme or like that 
music. This is the basis of fan clubs, genre websites, social chat groups at work and 
numerous other manifestations of collective cultural choice. It is also the basis on which 
billions of dollars are spent worldwide establishing brands, trends, stars, reputations, and 
all the other devices by which creative producers establish communities defined by 
taste.11  
                                                 
7 I am indebted to Bridget Rosewell for pointing out the centrality of differentiation in what the creative industries do. 
8 Since cultural differentiation is always present, how do we know which products are cultural-creative? This makes it particularly 
problematic to decide exactly which part, for example, of the textile industry should be treated as fashion and which as mere clothing. 
Generally speaking the industry itself makes the distinctions, containing a mass-production sector in which distinction is relatively 
unimportant, a designer sector, a brand sector, and so on up to elite categories like haute couture.  
9 See Desai (2008) 
10 See for example http://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/docs/interview03.php  
11 Indian words such as pundit, mogul and guru have acquired particular status, perhaps arising from the richness of differentiations to 
be found in India’s history, or maybe the Western penchant for exoticising both cultural products and the Orient. 
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It may be thought that the issue is simply one of individual taste: I like Disney and you 
like Almodovar. If so, the Disney Corporation has wasted an exorbitant amount of money 
establishing the brand of its characters, and we should either be very surprised it is so 
well off or, disputably, conclude that Mickey Mouse and Happy Feet are intrinsically 
artistically superior products. Disney has created cultural distinctions, not just listened to 
them. Distinctions are themselves a product of the industry. 
What is the social function of culture? 
The elevation of distinction into a product leads to the most hotly-contested area of 
discussion in the arts: if all taste is relative, what good is it? John Carey’s (2006) superbly 
iconoclastic What Good are the Arts? demolishes many claims (beginning surprisingly 
late in history)12 that the arts are intrinsically useful. He dismisses, with good evidence, 
almost every idea so far advanced that there is something intrinsically good, elevating, or 
improving for the human character about art. His most impressive chapter demonstrates 
that Hitler, cast by many as a failed minor painter, was an exceptionally knowledgeable 
and dedicated aesthete for whom art was a central objective of human existence. How, 
Carey forces us to ask, can we claim an objective or transhistorical basis to declare art 
good, if it is recognised and mobilised by social forces considered evil and backward by 
every other criterion? 
Carey summons many personages to his casting audition: philosopher, scientist, 
sociologist, aesthete, critic, pietist and politician. One character he does not bother to call 
is the economist. Duly humbled, the economist submits something he appears to have 
overlooked: wrongly or rightly, people pay for culture. As Dymov notes, we do not need 
to know why people choose to pay for something, in order to recognise that they find it 
useful. The whole point of cultural differentiation is to escape the judgement of others, or 
to be more precise, to choose one’s judges. In the market, society establishes it has a use, 
even if consumers cannot clearly state what that use is. 
This suggests we should shift attention from forlorn attempts to judge whether art or 
culture is good, to looking at the social effect of producing and consuming it. There is 
widespread agreement that a critical function of culture is in the reproduction of society. 
Thus Freud (2004:110): 
We know that human culture, by which I mean everything in which human life has risen above its 
animal circumstances and in which it distinguishes itself from animal life (and I refuse to separate 
culture and civilization) shows the observer two sides. It includes on the one hand all the knowledge 
and skill that humanity has acquired in order to control the forces of nature and obtain from it the goods 
to satisfy human needs, and on the other hand all the institutions that are required to govern the relations 
of human beings to one another and in particular the distribution of such goods as can be obtained.  
Obviously, there are things about society that we consider good and things we consider 
bad, some things we would like to keep and some things we would like to change. This is 
a matter of ethical or political judgement. No ‘science’ outside of society tells us whether 
Gordon Brown will make a good Prime Minister, in the same sense as telling us whether 
an aeroplane will fly. It is thus not surprising that science cannot tell us what is good or 
bad art, since it is simply another of the several institutions that keep society in existence. 
We may of course wish to observe whether the social choices that arise from art, whether 
                                                 
12 Carey notes that Plato places the arts second from bottom in a list of useful human practices. One of the curiousities of the western 
classical tradition is the value it places on Greek art, which in no wise reproduces the attitudes of the Greeks themselves.  
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as a commodity or handed out through public or communal institutions, are consistent 
with other ethical choices. If society judges that equality is important, and if at the same 
time pays fabulous sums of money to buy works of art, then we do not need to agree 
whether this money is worth it, to judge that society may wish to provide equality of 
access, by means of galleries and the like, to what it clearly judges important.  
By the same measure if society judges personal freedom to be important, and if people 
are willing to pay perhaps smaller sums of money to buy other types of art, then it would 
be a consistent thing to find ways of making sure they are free to do this. Again, we do 
not need to make a judgment on whether their choice is a good one, in order to find a 
rational basis for such a policy.  
Equally if fascist bands produce racist songs, then society is entitled to excoriate and 
indeed suppress them, not because they are bad art but because they are bad culture – 
because racism is no more acceptable in the field of art than it is in the sphere of politics 
or society. 
This becomes more complicated when commodified culture becomes a player in 
reproducing contested parts of society such as its classes or its power structures. 
Judgements on the merits or demerits of these classes and their actions become mixed up 
with artistic judgements. Writers such as Bourdieu (1979) and Elias (1997) emphasize 
how artistic distinctions buttress and maintain communities directly associated with class 
or status. 
This merely shows us, however, that in the form of the market in cultural products, such 
relations that we think of as purely political or purely social, in fact receive additional 
determinations in the market, which may be contested there just as in the public sphere. 
Hesmondhalgh (2007:2003-4) thus criticizes the role of media moguls such as Rupert 
Murdoch in shaping the editorial content of the newpsapers they control.  
Murdoch revived the strategies of direct control associated with the press barons of the early twentieth 
century, such as Northcliffe, Beaverbrook and Hearst (the man on whom Orson Welles based Citizen 
Kane). Murdoch would apparently rewrite leaders that were insufficiently supportive of the hard right 
Prime Minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher, and removed left-leaning or moderate conservative 
editors. He exerted pressure on his liberal editor at The Times by refusing to fix an editorial budget and 
thereby gaining the chance to approve any editorial decision that needed significant spending. 
Artistic and cultural choices are of course influenced by the preferences or actions of the 
owners of the cultural or creative industries. It is well-known that Walt Disney’s 
characters gave expression to a his personal and particular vision of conservative middle-
class American values.  
The point is, however, that these are merely particular features of the cultural-creative 
commodity. They do not make it into something other than a commodity. Why should it 
be surprising that culture, along with material existence, is reproduced through market 
relations as well as through social and political ones? At the end of the day, the market is 
simply another institution, and as such its ultimate function, like all others, is the 
production and reproduction of society. 
Cultural-creative commodities, then, are commodities that play the particular role of 
creating, shaping, maintaining and reproducing social distinctions. This is what gives rise 
to the particular and peculiar type of markets in which we find them. I now turn to a 
study of these. 
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A new type of market 
The cultural and creative market is a new type of market. This requires us to revisit most 
basic assumptions of economics, but also to draw on its deeper insights, in order to 
identify how the nature of this market shapes the industrial structure which services it. 
Differentiated price distinctions 
Perhaps the most basic economic ‘law’ of the market is the ‘law of one price’ which 
suggests that a single price tends to establish itself, through competition, for a single type 
of use. It is on this basis that we speak, for example, of the ‘price of fish’ or the ‘price of 
oil’. Actually this price is always an average of a range of prices – Sea Bass does not 
fetch the same price as Salmon, Brent Crude oil sells at a different rate from Forties, and 
so on. Nevertheless these products substitute for each other, limiting the range of 
variation. Once, however, cultural differentiation enters the field, each product becomes 
distinct and all bets are off. There is no such thing as the ‘price’ of a painting, yet there is 
clearly a price for seeing a film. 
The reason for this is the productivity revolution in service delivery itself which removes 
natural limits on reproduction. Creative producers thus compete in two ‘directions’ – for 
market share, as with films, and for price, as with art and fashion.  
Market behaviour is therefore quite different in the creative and cultural industries, and 
the search for brand, tied up with the search for reputation, becomes decisive. In 
consequence novelty becomes deliberately sought-after. The simplest way to make a 
product socially limited is to make it new; the limit on the size of its market becomes the 
time for which it is available. 
The result is that creative products have an extremely short life cycle. The fashion season 
is essentially half a year; the life of a film is at most a few months, of a popular music 
recording perhaps a few weeks. This has come to dominate the management of many 
apparent exceptions hailed as universals – classical music, fine art, Shakespeare, museum 
displays, via the institution of the exhibition, which is actually a device for periodically 
changing the experience associated with a universal, introducing a life cycle also for 
inherited objects, lived out in its mode of display. 
In consequence however, the speed of movement of the market becomes a decisive 
factor. The characteristic of all but a few creative and cultural products is thus short 
production runs and timely delivery. This in turn crucially shapes the nature of the 
modern creative production process. 
The strange death of the individual consumer 
Equally, the widespread economic assumption of ‘methodological individualism’ cannot 
apply. The consumer confronts the cultural market not as a purely private individual but 
as social being, whose likes and dislikes are defined with respect to the choices of others. 
Consequently the price mechanism is no longer the main source of information available 
to agents. Consumers react to what other consumers are doing in making their choice: the 
market in cultural products is inherently social.  
The consequence of both this and differentiated pricing is that the ‘market’ in cultural 
products transcends natural limitations. It is a purely social construction in every respect 
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including its production process. Its costs are decreasingly resource-determined and 
become increasingly costs of establishing taste. Dolce and Gabbana sunglasses are 
expensive not because they cost a lot to make, but because it costs a lot to sets them 
above other sunglasses. Their use consists of their exclusiveness and their cost consists in 
making them exclusive. The same is evident from Intellectual Property (IP), which is a 
social, not a naturally-determined construction. In particular, copyright payments are not 
real costs at all in the sense of labour, extractive or manufacturing costs. They are 
essentially a form of rent. 
As a consequence, investment in creative products is, primarily, investment in second-
guessing, understanding and managing social behaviour. Hence, for example, the 
advertising industry, whose essential function is to establish and manage tastes. Hence, 
also, the typical structure of the fashion industry which is has to identify and set trends in 
taste whose crucial inputs are no longer spinners, weavers, tailors and dressmakers, but 
designers, fashionistas, celebrities and brands. This gives rise to the ‘economically’ 
inexplicable behaviours of the creative market: branding, trendsetting, imitation, 
reputations establishment, the pundit, and so on.13 
Managed disequilibrium 
A consequence of price distinction and social choice is that markets of this type are 
intrinsically incapable of ‘equilibrium’, arguably the key construct of modern economics. 
The ‘discovery of the new’ is almost by definition the rejection of the old. Iconoclasm 
and novelty becomes characteristic product signifiers. Impressionism and German 
Expressionism began as rejectionist movements. The dream of every wannabe artist, , 
designer or even cook is to be new, that is different from what has gone before. The 
process of change dominates cultural markets. 
For short life cycle products, dynamic behaviours dominate in the short run.14 The 
creative industries overturn and reverse traditional economic ideas. Thus innovating 
ought to entail a ‘negative externality’. An innovator sinks costs into research which 
place an idea in the public domain, at which point a competing enterprise can simply use 
the new idea without paying for the research. Innovating should therefore, according to 
traditional theory, pay a penalty so that research must be protected by public policy, by 
means of patent legislation to protect the researchers’ investment. 
But in the creative industries, this breaks down. The creator of a new product – be it a 
song, a film genre, a fashion item or even a designer must-have such as the I-pod or the 
Dysan – obtains what is sometimes termed ‘first-mover advantage’. With a short life-
cycle, the originator can capture the excess profits that accrue because consumers will 
pay for the new before the imitators can move in. In fact originators even welcome 
imitators, because this flattery confirms the iconic status of the original ‘true’ product. 
Gucci is rumoured to have consciously encouraged pirates to ‘prove’ the product was a 
leading brand. 
                                                 
13 The 2007 Creative Economy Programme initiated by the UK DCMS has produced a detailed analysis of many aspects of this 
process. 
14 For long life cycle products, dynamic behaviours dominate in the long run, which is a different matter. See Freeman, Kliman and 
Wells (2004) 
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Intrisic uncertainty and symmetrical ignorance 
Caves (2000) accurately describes a further essential particularity of the cultural-creative 
industries, the state of knowledge of the creative producer. Modern contract theory has 
evolved the idea of ‘asymmetric information’, but creative contracts embody what Caves 
terms ‘symmetric ignorance’. Nobody actually knows, in advance, whether a product will 
succeed or not. This has obliged the industry to convert uncertainty into risk – it has to 
statistically quantify the prospects of success or failure. The film industry was perhaps 
the first to manage this process, building into its calculations a knowledge of the mix of 
flops, turkeys and smash-hits required to maintain an adequate return on capital. This 
produces a characteristic form of contract which Caves describes and which can generally 
be described as risk-sharing contracts. 
The production process of the cultural industries 
All the above features of the creative market have created a new industrial structure based 
on rapid and flexible production to an abstract or incomplete specification. The ‘Fordist’ 
paradigm was directed at producing the largest possible run of the most similar possible 
product, leading to Henry Ford’s famous dictum. In contrast for the creative industries, 
flexibility is everything. A cultural producer must turn around, in the shortest possible 
time, a requirement to produce a small number of products to exacting criteria. 
Moreover these criteria themselves are not defined in terms of the physical 
characteristics of the product but the effect it has to have. An assembly line is possible 
because every single characteristic of the car, down to the minutest detail, is foreknown. 
The production model is exact repetition of a complex but identical sequence of steps – in 
a word, automation.  
For a creative product the sequence of steps is never the same, and is not foreknown. The 
creative producer starts from the effect required, and supplies – ‘creates’ – the missing 
sequence of operations by writing the book, producing the artwork, interpreting the 
music, or adding the decoration. It may be thought that this itself is at least semi-
automatic since a musical score, a choreographed dance sequence, or a film or theatre 
script defines what the musician, dancer or actor must do, but this misses the point. Since 
the aim is differentiation, what the consumer seeks is precisely the capacity of the 
musician, the dancer and the actor to vary the rules and to interpret the automatic 
sequence differently from another musician, dancer or actor. 
The actor, the stage-manager or the lighting designer conform to the script, but bring to it 
their own particular knowledge and experience in order to create the desired effect. This 
penetrates every layer of the creative production process. Increasingly, every participant 
in a creative production is her or himself called on to be creative. The requirement of 
differentiation, of flexible production to an abstract or incomplete specification, becomes 
the sine qua non of the sought-after provider. 
Yet when the curtain goes up, everything must work. The presses must roll, the 
performers must be assembled, the building must open. ‘Lights, camera, action’ is the 
watchword of the new paradigm. This is a fundamental new moment in the evolution of 
the differentia specifica which for Marx singled out humans from beasts: their capacity to 
plan. The constructions of the bees, he noted, are every bit as complex as those of 
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humans. But what distinguishes humans from bees is that before they build, first they 
plan. First they conceive, in their minds, what it is they are going to do.  
But ‘planning’ in the sense of the old modernity, is exactly what the creative artist does 
not do. What she does is imagine; she creates in her mind, not the picture of the whole 
edifice, but the image of the effect it will have. The differentia specifica of creative 
humanity is one stage beyond the Victorian engineer. Creation does not automate the the 
specification of what it is going to do – it shapes a new reality around it. 
The industrial characteristics of cultural production 
These requirements have created a new industrial structure organised around flexibility. 
Caves singles out the ‘motley crew’ characteristic of the creative production process as 
decisive. Any given product requires a multiplicity of creative inputs: one needs only stay 
for any film while the credits are rolled to see just how varied these are.  
This combines with a characteristic which Hesmondhalgh (2007) terms ‘cultural 
autonomy’. I will liberally and perhaps wrongly interpret this as follows: In each sphere 
of creative production, specialist skills and experiences are concentrated and the user of 
these skills must accept that she or he cannot exactly or precisely determine how the job 
is done – only what the result is. This result, in turn is as we have noted defined abstractly 
and imperfectly. 
For this reason the characteristic form of cultural industry organisation is through the 
team – a specific organization of a variety of inputs and activities, frequently contracted 
out and put together for the purpose of a single product. This gives rise to an entire range 
of functionaries whose role is in the organisation of teams: the impresario, the producer, 
the director, the scriptwriter, the choreographer. The team retains the creative character of 
the undertaking despite having a management structure, because of the centrality of 
interpretation.  
This gives rise in term to two requirements of the industry. The most important is 
proximity. This aspect of the effect of globalisation has been severely understated. 
Creative industries are concentrated because, in order to put together teams from the 
widest and most diverse range of producers, the team organizers have to find the required 
talents, skills and experiences on hand, and interact with them directly. This feature has 
led to the ‘city factory’ replacing the ‘factory city’. In contrast to the industrial city of the 
past containing a huge army of near-identical providers of a single narrow range of skills, 
be it car-building, mining or ship-building. For the modern global city diversity is 
everything for the cultural producer: she or he seeks the widest possible range of 
providers within a walk or a taxi-ride of each other. 
The second requirement is flexibility. Because each product is different, each team is 
different, and the specific combination of team members is never the same. This has often 
eluded traditional research – for example, a great deal of the innovation in the creative 
and cultural industries takes place not within the providers but in the relations between 
them. Asking a camera crew, a print shop, an architect company or a designer house 
whether it has innovated misses the point: when we examine the process by which a film, 
brochure, building or new product emerges we find that the innovation lies in the what 
the producers have been asked to do, or how they have been put together. 
The reverse tendency is to be found in the formation of cultural and creative 
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conglomerates. This tendency, however, confirms the rule. What does the modern media 
conglomerate do? In what respect does it differ, for example, from the global car firm? It 
lies precisely in its social role. The media conglomerate does not concentrate in its hands 
the means to produce the material product. It concentrates the means to produce the 
social status. The most decisive requirement, to control risk, maximize sales, and 
maintain market dominance is not the number of CDs or articles of clothing that the 
company can produce on machines to which it is happy to outsource its production, but 
its control of names, brands, product lines and reputations. The modern cultural 
conglomerate is a social, not a material, organizer. 
The nature of creative labour 
To summarise what has so far been said, the cultural and creative production process is 
arranged to produce a distinctive product and, because of the distinctive type of market 
generated by this product, has evolved a distinctive type of production. The product is 
culturally differentiated goods, and the production process is flexible manufacture, with a 
short life cycle, to an abstract or imperfect specification. What is the resource that this 
calls on? My answer is: its workers. The cultural and creative industries have emerged as 
specialist users of creative labour. 
Some indications of this specialisation are already evident in the geographical 
concentration of the creative industries. Writers such as Richard Florida (2002) have 
already drawn attention to the exceptional concentration of creative workers in particular 
sites, above all large urban centres which are also the site of extensive diversity – places 
where many gays, many ethnic groupings, many cultures are to be found. The GLA’s 
research revealed an altogether disproportionate weight of London and the South-East in 
the growth and presence of the creative industries. With this in mind we constructed a 
‘creative intensity index’: a measure of the proportion of creatively occupied workers that 
also work in a creative industry. 
The results are strongly indicative of a real process. In all regions except the East 
Midlands (where the decline of the traditional textile industries play an anomalous 
statistical role) and Scotland, creative intensity has risen over seven years by a factor of 
up to 50 per cent, to reach sizes between 40 and 50% of the workforce: clearly such 
companies are not hiring simple undifferentiated labour. Intensity is highest, and has 
grown fastest where creative production has itself grown the fastest: in London, the 
metropolitan centre.  
Creativity as universal human capacity 
This evidence, though it requires further study, strongly supports the view that a process 
of specialisation is under way, with creative labour as key resource. What is special about 
it? Is there a ‘general creative human capacity’ which is an input to all industries 
matching the definition above? From the data we have presented, yes. If so, then just as 
the oil industry is defined by its primary input – crude oil – there may be some 
justification for treating the creative industries in terms of their primary input – creative 
labour.  
To shed light on this it is worth drawing attention to an ignored theorem in mathematical 
logic which explains both what is specific about the software industry and also why 
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creative labour is indispensible. The Turing-Church theorem15 establishes that there are 
problems with no general solution. It is impossible to write an algorithm, for any but the 
simplest classes of problem, such that a new problem will not arise which the algorithm 
cannot solve. The theorem applies to ‘real-life’ problems that people really want to solve: 
for example it is impossible to write a general language translator. One can write a 
programme for any two particular languages, but one cannot write a programme that will 
apply to any arbitrary new language. 
The specific nature of creative labour thus corresponds to the requirements of the cultural 
and creative industries: the extension without natural limits of the range of human 
experiences and hence the problems that producers need to solve. 
As the saying goes, it’s a wrap. The cultural and creative industries create a particular 
product – culturally differentiated goods and services. They employ a particular method – 
the flexible production of short-life products to an abstract or imprecise specification. 
And they use a specific resource – creative human labour. The curtain has risen on the 
world’s oldest industry. 
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